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Legal Institutions and Social Controls
Philip Selznick*
When the architects of this program asked me to discuss non-legal
social controls, I assume they had in mind the need for greater
humility within the legal profession. So proud an occasion as this calls
for sober reflection on the limits of the distinctively legal-on the contingent, derivative, and partial place of formal adjudication and control within the larger ordering of human society.
I have no objection to communicating such a perspective, thereby
adding an appropriate note of piety to these proceedings. Nevertheless, I think it may be more important for us to consider some of the
great social changes that are occurring in modem society, how they
affect the balance between legal and non-legal controls, and what
problems this changing balance poses for the legal order. The humility
we ask of lawyers may be all too welcome to them. The real message
may be a summons to responsibility and joint effort, not a suggestion
that lawyers retreat to what they know best.
My assigned topic covers a very large part of what sociology (or
more broadly, behavioral science) is about. For we are interested
in all the ways social order is created and sustained. We study
control in small groups and large ones; we study gross mechanisms
of control and subtle ones; we see in every human setting the forces
that encourage and enforce responsible conduct. Of course, we also
give much attention to the breakdown of social control and to the
emergence of what is, from the standpoint of the group or situation,
irresponsible or "deviant" behavior.
Paralleling every major legal concern is a much larger and more
finely textured system of codes and relationships. Interests of personality are recognized and protected in many areas of the law, yet
how little we really depend on law for the day-by-day comfort we
gain from orderly arrangements that save us from embarrassment,
unwanted intrusions, or worse. The law of contracts facilitates and
protects concerted activity, but the bonds of organization rest far
more on practical and informal reciprocity and interdependence than
they do on the availability of formal sanctions. Society is still held
together by self-help and not by the intervention of legal agencies.
* Professor of Sociology and Chairman, Center for the Study of Law and Society,
University of California, Berkeley. My remarks reflect in part the work being carried
on at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, particularly studies of the administration of criminal justice by Jerome H. Skolnick, and of corrections by Sheldon L.
Messinger.
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Claims of right are asserted, adjudicated, and enforced for the most
part outside the formal legal system.
Having said this much, I must hasten to add that there is considerable variation, at different times and places, and in different
sectors of society and law, in the effectiveness of self-help and in
reliance on legal controls. It is here, at the point of variation, that
real inquiry begins.
I.
The evolution of modem society is marked by two master trends
that have brought with them decisive changes in social control and
in the role of law. The first of these trends is often referred to as
the drift toward mass society. The second and closely related master
trend is the increasing bureaucratization and centralization of industrial society.
There is a cruel contrast in these twin lines of evolution. In a
mass society there is more freedom, more participation, more mobility,
more equality. On the other hand, the bureaucratic trend creates a
world of complex organizations, of more formalized controls, of centralized power, of individual helplessness and dependency. Yet both
trends have the same source-the creation of an industrial society that
imposes a remorseless logic on every human community that comes
within its sway.
In contemporary social science there is much interest in studying
the effects of industrialization on the non-Western world. These
societies, rapidly emerging out of a preindustrial past, are breaking
the bonds of tradition, family, and locality. Reaching out for modern
technology and its fruits, they are indeed experiencing great strains.
To a certain extent, the history of industrialization in Europe and the
United States is being recapitulated. All this is of great importance
and eminently worth pursuing. On the other hand, I venture to
suggest that we have not yet fully absorbed the significance for our
own institutions of the industrial and urban revolution.
For a long time, our society has had much to cushion it against
the full impact of modernization. Until quite recently we continued
to have a fairly strong rural and small-town counterweight. Our large
immigrant population had its own resources of social organization.
Political, economic, and cultural diversity set limits to change and
helped give men roots. The inertia of tradition could sustain for
generations a sense of identity and of moral continuity.
The loosening of social bonds, and the concomitant weakening of
non-legal controls, is manifest in many ways. The most important,
of course, is the decline of kinship as the major unit of social organization and therefore of social control. That the functions of the family
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have changed in recent history is a familiar sociological tale. What
was once an enterprise and a nuclear community, a unit of production
and an indispensable alliance against a forbidding external world,
has now become a more specialized and limited institution. What
it can do for its members, and what it may ask of them, have both
been radically curtailed.
This is not to say that the family is unimportant. Of course it
is still the chief source of personal gratification, the main agency
for socializing the young, the true staff of life for most men and
women. But the family has become a significantly weaker reed, both
for the individual and for society. After all, we are not speaking here
of complete social breakdown but of shifts that markedly aggravate
our problems of social control. We still ask much of the family, but
we have not fully recognized that its resources as an institution, its
tools for doing the job, have become more and more limited.
As I see it, we are not dealing primarily with moral atrophy, the
corrosion of personal values. If that exists, it is a symptom and not
a cause. The main reasons for the waning role of the family in social
control are practical and stem from larger changes in our economic
life. The truth is that discipline in the family is less effective today
because its practical significance in the routines of life has sharply
declined. In an important but limited sense, it is no longer needed.
When the family is really a going concern, and the activities of its
members must be coordinated, if not for production then at least
as a condition of survival, the need for discipline is apparent. Authority makes sense to the individual because it is justified by urgent
necessity. Moreover, the family member is heavily dependent on this
small social world and its resources. Given such a setting, it is easy
for appropriate moral sentiments to be created and sustained.
Let us remember that for the most part society must rely on the
willing acceptance of discipline. Without consent, discipline may be
enforced, but that is always less effective and has heavy costs. Now
what is the foundation of this consent? It may be that some societies
have won consent to authority by creating an irresistible cake of
custom, a communicated sense of what is right and wrong, respectable
and disreputable. I suspect that this sort of thing is greatly exaggerated. The natural habitat of the human being is a, world of
opportunity and constraint, of alternatives set by the practical
exigencies of making a living and winning self-esteem. Customs are
enforced, not abstractly and mechanically, but in the course of giving
guidance to activities that make sense in their own terms. When
the activities no longer make sense, we can expect social codes and
symbols to attenuate and lose their force.
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That the adolescent needs discipline in his own psychic interests
I do not doubt. That society would be better off if the family could
exercise more effective control may also be true. But such a function
cannot be simply "assigned" to the family. It will not be performed
at the desired levels if it does not flow naturally out of the requirements of everyday life.
The weakening of the family as an agency of social control is only
a phase, although a major one, of the broader trend toward a looser,
less disciplined social order. Thus another feature of our society
is the steady decline of fixed status as a vehicle of social control. For
today's Americans, of all groups and classes, status-seeking is a sign
of a society on the move. It is a good guess that many fewer people
today than two generations ago "know their place" and limit their
actions and their aspirations accordingly. We sometimes forget, I
think, how much even our own society has depended on the proprieties of status, on the giving and receiving of deference. Perhaps most
important, we have counted on a large amount of voluntary segregation, so that the more privileged and the better integrated member
of the community might live out his respectable life without being
much affected by his more vulgar fellow citizens.
This comfortable scheme of things already seems unreal. It will
soon be gone forever. The dispossessed are knocking at the door.
They are making their presence known, refusing to accept the rightness of middle-class values, appealing to a broader sense of justice.
The revolution of rising expectations is far from restricted to the
underdeveloped countries. On the contrary, it is no less important
right here.
One way of observing the breakdown of group barriers is to take
note of the spread of working-class patterns of dress and leisure-time
activity among middle-class children. In our open, fluid society, styles
do not flow only from the top down. They also move up from
below. The result is a cultural diffusion that adds little to the
stability of community life. We have created a society that makes
these things possible and even inevitable. This we have done for
good and sufficient reasons, but we must be ready to pay the
price.
It seems obvious to me that we are in no position to deplore this
waning of non-legal controls. Dedicated as we are to personal autonomy and well-being, we cannot very well yearn for the submergence
of the individual in family or community. We expect and value his
self-assertion; we shall honor in due course his new claims of right.
Committed as we are to political freedom and legal equality, we
cannot fail to accept the social transformations born in part of those
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ideals. Perhaps it is not logically necessary that political freedom
be translated into social opportunity, or that legal equality produce
a social leveling. But our political and legal concepts have, for
better or worse, been hooked on to large-scale industry, the mass
market, and mass communications. Together they create a revolutionary thrust that loosens and tears the social fabric.
The changes to which I have referred must inevitably increase the
burdens of our legal institutions. If society cannot depend on an
informal, autonomous, self-regulating, person-centered order for the
maintenance of social control, it will turn to more explicitly
organized agencies and to more powerful instruments of surveillance
and regulation. Not only the police, but the schools, social work
agencies, and perhaps other institutions, will be called upon to serve
the needs of social control.
Traditionally, the formal agencies of control have been relatively
weak. Their resources were limited, their techniques crude. Their
effect on the life of the community was softened by a recognition
of their own dependence on the people around them and by the
continuity of the official and the ordinary citizen. The cop on the
beat belonged to the community and he manifested his membership
in dress and demeanor. Are we not already describing things remembered, a fading era?
The combination of social demand and technical competence will,
in the not too distant future, create far more effective agencies of
legal control. They will be more efficient and more honest, more
isolated from the community and less dependent on it. They will
be expert monitors of the round of life and will naturally tend to
move from partial to total surveillance. Perhaps most important, the
new agencies will have absorbed a prophylactic orientation, a doctrine
of prevention to supplement repression.
When coercive authority enlarges its competence and adopts new,
more positive goals, we have an obligation to sit up and take notice.
The chief barrier to unbearable despotism has always been the limited
competence of the ruler. It is one thing to have the ideology of
autocracy, and its trappings; it is another to have the means to put
it into practice. Thirty years ago Charles Merriam could write of
the "poverty of power"-the "wide gap between the apparent omnipotence of authority and the actual operation of power, between the iron
fist of force and its incidence upon human flesh and feeling."' This
is still very largely true. But is it not the deeper lesson of our century
that effective, total power can be mustered and sustained, if not
1. Mmmum, PoLrrIcAL PowER 156 (1934).
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forever, then at least long enough to exact a memorable toll in suffering and degradation?
When an institution has low capabilities, it tends to conserve its
strength, to be passive rather than active. It waits for things to
happen, to make themselves visible. Increase its capabilities and a
subtle transformation may occur. Now the agency can exercise more
initiative and reach out to deal with potential trouble. Such a prospect raises very real questions regarding the security of citizens
who occasionally run afoul of the law.
As agencies of control become more rational and efficient, we may
well hope for more searching study of how our institutions actually
operate and what values lie half-hidden in accustomed practice, in
administrative use and wont, in the traditional way of doing things.
For example, how much do we depend on the policeman's role as a
kind of magistrate, a dispenser of rough and ready justice as he
exercises discretion in the streets? What will happen to this role in
the motorized and mechanized elite corps of the future?
The ideal of equal justice seems to require that all offenders be
treated alike. Yet there is evidence that the police routinely attempt
to distinguish, especially among juveniles, the apparently casual offender from the committed delinquent. Lawyers and other social
scientists may see in this a violation of even-handed justice. And
indeed this is so, especially where racial and class bias are operative.
But when confronted with these facts I am moved to ask: If the
law is administered with prudence, does this not require some differential treatment at the first point of contact and not only after judgment, when ultimate disposition is made? Do we need or want
agencies of control so efficient and so impartial that every actual offender has an equal chance of being known and processed? In considering this point we should bear in mind that offenses of all kinds
are probably very much more numerous in fact than in record.
As you can see, I am concerned that we do not respond too
eagerly and too well to the apparent need for more effective
mechanisms of social control. In the administration of justice, if
anywhere, we need to guard human values and forestall the creation
of mindless machines for handling cases according to set routines.
Here vigilance consists in careful study of actual operations so that
we may know what will be lost or gained when administrative changes
are proposed.
I have emphasized the dangers of competence, particularly in the
technology of surveillance. Other problems arise, however, because
of institutional incompetence. I refer to the quest for rehabilitation,
for transforming punishment into treatment, for a mode of organiza-
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tion and decision that will permit the courts and other agencies to
act in the offender's own interests.
The most remarkable feature of our criminal law is indeed this
effort to seek new ways of doing justice. The civilized impulse manifest here does honor to us all. And yet, some doubts are raised. If
a man is to be rehabilitated, he must be accessible. What are the
limits of this access, both physical and psychological? If injustice
occurs, what are the principles to which appeal can be made? Are
the institutions within which this work goes on really capable of
doing more than providing, at best, humane custody? If these institutions cannot provide treatment, yet purport to do so, what are
the actual rules according to which time is served? Are these rules
subject to criticism and control?
I do not mean to throw cold water on the attempts being made,
notably in my own state, to transform the administration of corrections. In the long run there is hope for it. In the shorter run, there
are limitations. Among these limits are the administrative resources,
including appropriate knowledge, available for carrying out the intent
of the law. The more we ask of the law, from the standpoint of
creative change, the more important is this administrative base. And
the problem is exacerbated when the legislature offers, in response to
public sentiment, a murky mixture of incompatible demands.
Perhaps the most important issue raised by these developments is
the violation of personal privacy. It is one of the ironies of our
age that men of good will are concerned about privacy but, at the
same time, support the most ruthless invasions of it. When official
control is combined with sensitivity to personality, the outcome may
be greater protection of basic human rights, including the right to be
secure in one's private fears and fantasies. Another possibility, however, is the kind of intrusive probing and exposure that is incompatible
with personal dignity.
The answer to this cannot be a withdrawal from or rejection of the
"treatment" perspective. With the weakening of more intimate settings, and the persistence, nevertheless, of humane ideals, society will
inevitably assume responsibility, through more formal agencies, for
personal help and guidance. The question is, have we worked out
the legal consequences of this uneasy and conceivably virulent combination of coercive power and moral persuasion?
Much of what I have said thus far adds up to a plea for more
intensive study, by lawyers and other social scientists, of the organizational aspects of legal procedure. The legal order is more than a
set of rules and principles. It is a congeries of administrative agencies
whose ways of working must decisively affect how the law actually
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impinges on the citizen and what its contribution is to the broader
life of the community. Presumption of innocence is no empty slogan
in our system, yet we have reason to believe that in actual operation
there is an administrative presumption of guilt. I do not say that this,
if true, is shocking or deplorable. It may be, in the end, perfectly
compatible with the legal assumption properly understood. Yet this
is the kind of thing that needs to be opened up for examination, if only
because there is always a serious possibility that administrative exigencies will subvert a legal ideal.
For it is still true that legal policy, like any other, needs effective
social supports. The more sensitive the policy, the more readily subject it is to distortion, and the more urgent are these supports. Some
laws, as we know, are self-administering, because they stimulate and
channel private initiative. Historically our system has depended on
that, but the more we ask of the law the more often shall we find
that this private initiative is lacking or ineffective. A recent study
of National Labor Relations Board cases involving union members
who lost their jobs because of union discrimination touches on this
problem.2 The workers were interviewed and a full story of the
context of the case, including what happened after the NLRB decision,
was obtained. The results are illuminating. When the worker is a
lone individual who has run afoul of union rules or otherwise given
offense, the NLRB proceeding may be better than nothing, but on
the whole it is quite ineffective. The worker has a hard time pursuing
his case and faces an even rougher time if he is rehired. The law,
as administered, offers little to the isolated individual confronted
with great organizational power. On the other hand, in those cases
where the member belonged to a faction, and thus had group support
both during the litigation and after it, he fared rather well. In that
setting, as in many others, a non-legal, autonomous order lends its
strength to the law.
For many purposes, we are not going to be able to depend on this
prior social organization, this force in being, this socially given capability of implementing legal norms. The legal order of the future
will strive to develop the conditions of its own effectiveness. This
suggests, again, more emphasis on the organizational side of things.
In addition to new, more or less distinctively legal institutions, such
as the juvenile court and the public defender, we should expect that
other parts of government, and some private associations as well, will
play a part in adding to the resources of the legal order. The coordination of these activities and agencies, within the framework of a
2. Manuscript in preparation by Bernard Samoff. The study was sponsored by the
Trade Union Project, Fund for the Republic.
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unitary legal system, will stretch the minds and perhaps try the
souls of legal analysts.
For example, how deep is our commitment to the adversary principle in the administration of justice? Is that principle fully compatible with new modes of adjudication and control? How much
variation in the adversary idea is acceptable? How far should it be
built into administrative structure and process? It seems clear that
this hallowed if sometimes embattled procedural canon needs a great
deal more study to assess its relevance for the legal system of the
future.
Another problem is the emergence of new bodies of law, founded
in dimly understood principles, confused by the ad hoc character of
our legislation and case law. Have we been witnesses to the development of a law of welfare whose concepts and doctrines, including
implications for procedure, need explication? What is the relation
between this emergent branch of law, if it is one, to the rest of the
system, especially the law of crimes? Is contemporary legal scholarship prepared to do the job of cutting across old categories and
creating new ones? These things are suggested, not by an abstract
concern for doctrinal clarity or symmetry, but by the compelling
pressures of the living law, the law in action.
II.
Earlier I suggested that we must accept a secular trend toward
the waning of non-legal social control. To the sociologist, this is a
phase of the drift toward mass society. I have also suggested that,
at the same time, legal agencies of control will have increased responsibilities thrust upon them.
There is another and rather different part of this picture to which
I should like to call attention. I refer to the growth of the largescale organization as the representative institution of modem life. In
industry, government, education, medicine, philanthropy-you name
it!-the principle of rational coordination, the bureaucratic principle,
holds sway. Self-perpetuating leadership and centralized authority
are fixed stars in our firmament. In these areas there is no waning of
social control. Quite the contrary. But is it non-legal control? That
question might provoke a prolonged debate.3
In an important sense, we are of course speaking of the private
sector of economy and society. On the other hand, many observers
have noted a blurring of the public and the private. A striking
3. The following comments draw upon my paper, "Private Government and the
Corporate Conscience," prepared for a Symposium on Business Policy at the Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, April 1963.
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feature of this development is the convergence of governmental and
non-governmental forms of organization and modes of action. A
great deal of government activity is similar to that carried on by
private groups. Government today includes many activities and
agencies that have little to do with the distinctive functions of the
sovereign and to which, therefore, the traditional logic of public law
may not properly apply. At the same time, discussions of the modern
corporation and trade union have increasingly stressed their "quasipublic" status. It is asked quite seriously whether such institutions
are really so different from large public enterprises or service agencies.
Furthermore, and perhaps more important, a kind of legality seems
to develop within these large enterprises. In both public and private
bureaucracies, authority and rule-making tend to take on the impersonality, the objectivity, and the rationality of a legal system. The
elaboration of formal rules creates expectations regarding the consistency and fairness of official action. In modern management there
is an inner dynamic tending toward a progressive reduction in the
arbitrariness of decision-making. In ever-wider areas of administration
there is a demand that decisions be made in the light of general
principles.
We are coming to see the private association as a group organized
for defined and public ends-public, that is, from the standpoint of
the group itself rather than the general community. Known and
acknowledged purposes provide the basis of adherence and discipline.
Given such ends, rational criteria may be developed to assess the
means used to attain them. Thus membership in an association is a
way of participating in a system of rationally coordinated activities.
Objective and impersonal standards, determined by the requirements
of that system, may be invoked for the assessment and control of
organizational members. The members in turn may claim the protection of those same rational criteria.
It is this commitment of professional management to an atmosphere
of legality-a commitment derived more from the necessities of
modern enterprise than from good will or ideology-that underlies the
widespread acceptance of private bigness as compatible with freedom. In our society the fear of corporate power has eased considerably. Criticism is muted in temper, reformist in intent, I believe
that this is mainly due to the growing conviction that the large'
corporation is not necessarily a "rough beast:' It is obscurely understood that the enterprise is enmeshed in circumstances that brake
its power and create, indeed, a corporate conscience.
What and where is the corporate conscience? The corporate conscience is the internally accepted system of fair dealing, of respect
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for personal rights, of authority constituted and justified by rational
necessity in the light of public ends. In a familiar phrase, it is
corporate "due process."
This emerging ethic has its chief source in the practical necessities
of industrial management. We see a convergence of three major
tendencies in the institutional history of the firm:
(1) The growing importance of impersonal procedures in the conduct of the enterprise-something I have already noted;
(2) the recognition of "human relations" as a critical factor in
management, especially the significance of respect and status-protection for employee morale; and
(3) the widespread adaptation of management to the power of
trade unionism and the creation thereby of systematic procedures for
the formulation and redress of grievances.
To say that a corporate conscience exists is not to say that we can
rely on it. In questions of power and justice, we do not rely upon the
individual conscience either. Our legal and political system necessarily postulates the existence of evil, especially the danger that some
merely human form, believing itself free of error, will attempt to
match its claimed perfection with unlimited power. Because of that
risk, we cannot rely upon good will, personal or institutional.
We should distinguish, however, what we can rely upon from what
we can aspire to. The ethic of rational coordination provides the
foundation for new expectations, new claims of right, new legal
controls. The existence of internal order within the enterprise validates external control and, at the same time, makes it feasible. It is
just because fairness is already institutionalized to a large extent in
the private sphere that an appeal to the larger political community,
to the legal order, is warranted. The firmer the sense of legitimate
expectation, the more likely it is that there will be an appeal beyond
the immediate setting. Moreover, if a quasi-legal system of fair dealing already exists, there is some assurance that the routine case will
be handled satisfactorily. Therefore, enforcement of exceptional
claims for redress of grievances becomes feasible.
I take the view that, in the evolving law of private associations, we
are responding to opportunities rather than resisting oppression. I do
not say that private power is not abused, but the really important fact
is that we now have the possibility, a product of modern history, of
extending the ideals of due process to private associations. This might
always have been a worthy objective, but the development of an
inner order within the modern enterprise brings that objective into
close accord with what historical reality makes possible.
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These reflections suggest that we take a long, leisurely look at
the so-called "limits of effective legal action." Can we assume fixed
legal resources? What if changing institutions, both inside and outside the legal sphere, offer new opportunities for enriching the sense
of justice? The answer may require a radical revision of that hardnosed legal philosophy which celebrates the settlement of disputes
and the curbing of irresponsible conduct. Today the law is summoned
to fulfill aspirations, not merely to meet the minimal needs of social
order. The business of taking that truth seriously may occupy us for
some years to come.

